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 Commercial Bank Underwriting of Credit-Enhanced Bonds: 
Are There Benefits to the Issuer? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Recent studies have expanded the commercial bank certification hypothesis to include 
banks acting in an underwriting capacity.  This paper further develops that research by focusing 
on the industrial revenue bond market in which banks have the unique opportunity to 
simultaneously act as both credit guarantor and underwriter.  When explicitly allowing for  bank-
issued standby letters of credit (guarantees), we find significantly greater yield spreads for those 
bonds underwritten by commercial banks compared to bonds underwritten by investment banks.  
Overall, no net benefit appears to accrue to the bond issuer when attempting to achieve joint (or 
double) certification benefits by employing commercial banks as both credit guarantor and 
underwriters except in the special case where the same bank acts as both guarantor and 
underwriter.  This latter result is consistent with an "economy of scope" in monitoring and 
reusing information. 
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Commercial Bank Underwriting of Credit-Enhanced Bonds: 
A Testing of Joint Certification 
 
Regulatory constraints on investment banking activities have severely limited the 
opportunity for studying the role of commercial banks as security underwriters in the United States.  
Nevertheless, the general findings to date suggest that smaller-sized firms that issue lower quality 
debt benefit most by having an underwriting relationship with a commercial bank.  Specifically, 
Puri (1996) finds that commercial bank underwritings of corporate bonds, in the pre-Glass-Steagall 
Act period, resulted in better pricing for smaller and lower credit- rated issuers than similar issues 
underwritten by investment banking firms.  Gande, Puri, Saunders and Walter (1997) draw similar 
conclusions for bond offerings in the post-1987 period, when banks were allowed to use their 
Section 20 securities subsidiaries to engage in corporate bond underwritings.  This study expands on 
the above research by examining the potential benefits, in terms of issuance costs, that (may) occur 
when commercial banks simultaneously act as both credit guarantor and underwriter in municipal 
bond financing transactions.  
Commercial banks are unique participants in the industrial revenue (and pollution control) 
bond primary market as they frequently issue standby letters of credit, as a means of credit 
enhancement (or guarantee), as well as underwriting the actual bond offering itself. As a result, the 
issuance of a standby letter of credit backing by a bank might be viewed as a positive signal 
regarding the quality of the borrower since the bank's issuance of the guarantee can be viewed as 
certification of the borrower's credit quality.  Similar certification effects have been found with new 
loans and loan renewals (i.e. see James, 1987, for example).   Indeed, the municipal revenue bond 
market is well recognized for its high degree of information asymmetry among issuers and investors 
Consequently, such certification services may be viewed as highly valuable.1  In addition, 
                                                 
 1 See Robbins, Apostolou, and Stawser (1985) and Ingram, Raman, and Wilson (1989). 
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commercial banks concerned about reputation may also bring certification benefit to the issuer 
through the underwriting process (see Puri (1996) for example).  To examine the benefits of 
"double" certification, that is to examine the benefit to the issuer from using commercial banks as 
both letter of credit guarantors and underwriters, a sample of industrial revenue bond issues offered 
during the 1987-1998 period were segmented into a sub-samples containing those bonds with 
(without) letter of credit backing and underwritten by investment banks, and bonds with (without) 
letter of credit backing and underwritten by commercial banks.  Using these sample partitions, as 
well as identifying sub-samples where the same bank offered both services (as opposed to different 
banks offering the two services separately), the empirical tests focus on the market’s response to the 
type of underwriting.  The market’s response is measured by the size of the tax adjusted reoffering 
yields achieved by the issuer relative to matched maturity U.S. Treasury securities. 
Since a standby letter of credit-backed bond is essentially a transaction-based loan in which 
a bank's guarantee provision cannot be inferred as indicative of a long-term banking relationship, 
and thus a long term monitoring (relationship) role, any certification benefit may be small.2  Indeed, 
if the market only reacts favorably to the credit provision (contingent or otherwise) via a long-term 
lending relationship (and the monitoring role that this implies), there may be little significant 
difference between yields on bonds backed by standby letters of credit and those without such credit 
enhancement.  Of course, the market may still view the guarantee favorably, irrespective of the 
degree of monitoring of the guarantee provider (the bank), as long as the credit quality of the 
guarantee provider is superior to that of the bond issuer.  In this case, a positive spread saving 
should be observed between those issues utilizing guarantees and those not utilizing guarantees.  In 
other words, the pure “insurance role” of guarantees would dominate the absence of benefits from 
any long term bank monitoring. 
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 In addition to the certification effect inherent in the decision to employ a standby letter of 
credit, the municipality must also choose among alternative underwriting options.  In particular, a 
municipality's choice-set of underwriter includes both traditional investment banking firms and 
commercial banks.  Controlling for the guarantee effects of letters of credit, we examine the relative 
degree to which the reputation of the commercial bank and investment banker adds to the value of 
an issue via reoffering yield spreads.  Indeed, in bringing an issue to market, the underwriter 
(whether an investment bank or commercial bank) will carry out information collection activities.  
In part, the reputation of the underwriter reflects the quality of this information monitoring and 
collection function over time. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 briefly describes the industrial 
revenue bond market.  Section 3 presents data and the basic empirical model.  Section 4 discusses 
the empirical results.  Finally, Section 5 provides a summary and conclusions. 
2. Industrial Revenue Bond  Market 
Industrial revenue bonds provide a means of tax exempt financing that has been used by a 
variety of corporations to fund the construction or acquisition of projects.  Some form of 
governmental unit, ranging from a city to an issuing authority, provides the conduit through which 
the municipality issues the bonds on behalf of the corporation.  In turn, the corporation pledges to 
pay the interest and principal on the bond usually in the form of a lease or loan agreement 
between the corporation and the issuing organization.  In lease arrangements, rental payments are 
used to make the required debt interest and principal payments.  The lease/purchase format 
allows the corporation to take advantage of applicable depreciation guidelines (and tax credits) 
as well as being able to deduct interest payments as a business expense.  When bonds are paid 
off, a corporation may assume title to the project itself for a nominal fee.  The underlying legal 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 See Berger and Udell (1995). 
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agreement with the municipality is typically at the corporate level, as opposed to the project 
(bond) level, which places bondholders in an unsecured position against the revenues of the 
corporation.  Additional security in the form of mortgage liens on the underlying project property 
or relet provisions under a lease agreement often enhance the bond's structure.3 
This form of tax exempt debt exhibits certain features.  The interest rate may range from a 
seven-day variable rate to a long-term fixed rate for 15-20 year maturities.  Corporate backed issues 
typically trade at higher taxable equivalent yields than similar unsecured taxable debt of the same 
corporation.  Principal repayment terms are often flexible and are structured to fit the unique cash 
flows of the company.  The bonds are usually not callable for a minimum of three years. 
Particularly, when the industrial revenue bonds are publicly traded, a commercial bank may 
provide credit enhancement via a standby letter of credit.  The letter of credit provides additional 
security to the bond investor.  The bank substitutes its credit worthiness for that of its client (the 
issuer) to increase the attractiveness of the offering.  With the employment of the standby letter, the 
company agrees, under a reimbursement agreement, to repay the bank for any draw-downs under 
the letter of credit agreement.  The bank may also designate whether additional collateral is required 
as security.  Typically, the commercial bank issuing the standby letter must be rated investment 
grade or better.  Moreover, the bank providing the letter of credit is often not the underwriter, i.e., 
the bond is underwritten by another bank (investment or commercial). 
Table 1 illustrates the relative importance of net issues in the municipal bond market in the 
context of all the other forms of public and private debt in the United States over the 1989-1998 
period.  Until recently, the Treasury securities market represented the largest segment of the new 
                                                 
3 This study does not explicitly allow for such internal credit enhancements for two reasons.  First, such 
information is not generally available from the sources employed.  Second, the specific value of such 
credit enhancements are difficult to measure because their respective values depend on the economic 
value of the asset, the transferability of the asset's use and the location of the asset. 
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issue debt market.  However, reflecting, among other things federal budget surpluses, the net size of 
the Treasury bond market is actually declining.  The average net funds raised in the municipal bond 
market totaled $38.55 billion per year over the 1989-1998 period. 
(Insert Table 1) 
3. Sample and Empirical Methodology  
 A.  Sample of Industrial Revenues Bonds    
 The sample of industrial revenue and pollution control bonds for this study were selected 
from all issues reported by Moody's Bond Record for the period 1987-1998.4   Before the late 
1980’s, few industrial revenue or pollution control bonds were supported by standby letters of 
credit and/or underwritten by commercial banks.  Development of the sample began by 
identifying those issues with fixed coupon rates for the life of the bond.  Thus, both floating and 
variable coupon bonds were excluded.  We also excluded those issues for which a complete set 
of variables required for the yield spread tests were unavailable.  The required variables included 
the tax adjusted premium (spread) between the municipal bond reoffering yield and a 
comparable maturity U.S. Treasury security, issue size, maturity, identification of the lessee, 
letter of credit issuing bank, underwriting firm, the maturity of the line of credit, and bond rating.  
The Appendix to the paper presents the sources of data and the approach used to measure the tax 
adjusted yield spread or premium. 
 The final sample consisted of 1003 issues.  Sub-samples include 665 issues which had no 
standby letter of credit backing and were underwritten by a traditional investment banker, 146 in 
which a commercial bank had issued the standby letter of credit but a traditional investment 
banker underwrote the offering, 82 issues in which commercial banks issued the standby letter of 
                                                 
4 In 1987, the Federal Reserve specifically allowed Section 20 subsidiaries of commercial bank holding 
companies to underwrite municipal revenue bonds. 
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credit but also underwrote the issue and finally, 110 issues in which there was no line of credit 
but a commercial bank underwrote the offering.  Of the 82 issues in which commercial banks 
provided both services, a total of thirty-six issues employed the same commercial bank in both 
functions.  Finally, there was no discernable trend over the period of our study in the frequency 
of commercial bank versus investment bank underwritings or in the proportion of sample bond 
offerings with standby letter of credit backing. 
 B.  Empirical Tests and Model Parameters  
 Our first test is to examine whether offering spreads differentiate between those issues 
underwritten by commercial banks and those by investment banks.  Subsequent tests examine 
whether a commercial bank and investment banker's reputation has a significant impact on the 
determination of offering spreads.  This is examined both with and without the letter of credit 
variable in the model.  Finally, employing the sample in which the same bank provided both the 
letter of credit and underwriting services, we explicitly test the tradeoff between joint 
certification benefits and any possible conflict of interest effects when the same bank provides 
both services for the issuer.5 
 The dependent variable, PREMIUM, is the yield on the municipal bond minus the yield 
to maturity for a comparable maturity U.S. government bond issued in the same month.  The 
Appendix explains how tax adjustments are made to both securities to present them on a 
comparable “yield” basis.  Determinants of the yield spread are assumed to be those variables 
specified on the right hand side of equation (1) and described below:  
 
                                                 
5 Such conflicts may be driven by banks seeking to boost their “fee income” and current earnings. 
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PREMIUM = b0 + b1BANK + b2LETTER + b3RATING + b4SIZE + 
b5MATURITY + b6LIST + b7PREVIOUS + b8REPUTATION + 
b9SUPPLY + b10TRATE + e                                                         (1)                                                            
in which: 
 PREMIUM Stated tax adjusted yield to maturity of the municipal bond minus 
the yield to maturity on U.S. government bond of nearest maturity 
issued in the same month.  (see Appendix) 
 LETTER A binary variable that assumes a value of 1 if the bond is backed 
by a commercial bank letter of credit and 0 if not. 
 RATING Moody's credit rating equal to 20 for AAA-rated bonds; 19 for 
AA1, and so on. 
 SIZE The $ size of the issue in millions. 
 MATURITY Number of months to maturity. 
 LIST A binary variable that assumes a value of 1 for those issuers 
(lessees) that are listed on a stock exchange and 0 if otherwise. 
 PREVIOUS A binary variable equal to 1 if the municipal entity has issued the 
same type of security before and 0 if otherwise. 
 REPUTATION The reputation of the investment banker underwriting the bond 
based on average level of co-managed or managed underwriting of 
industrial revenue bond offerings.  For commercial banks, the 
measure is a binary variable that assumes a value of 1 if the issuing 
entity is a Section 20 subsidiary and 0 if otherwise.  
 SUPPLY Volume of revenue bonds sold in same month as sample. 
 TRATE U.S. Treasury bond rate for issue comparable in maturity  
 to that of the sample offering. 
 
 The first variable, RATING, is the Moody's bond rating measured according to the scale 
employed by Barclay and Smith (1995) and Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995).6  This variable 
is orthogonalized by employing the residual from the regression of RATING on the LETTER and 
TRATE variables.  Controlling for LETTER allows us to measure the independent credit 
assessment effect of the rating agencies while controlling for TRATE reflects the findings of Duffee 
(1998) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) that the yield spreads on corporate bonds, over 
comparable maturity Treasury securities, fall when the Treasury bill rates rise.  (Longstaff and  
                                                 
6 These values are 20(AAA), 19(AA1), 18 (AA2), 17(AA3), 16(A1), 15(A2), 14(A3), 13(BBB1), 
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Schwartz conclude that such a relationship can be attributed to the negative correlation between 
firms’ asset values and default-free interest rates.)  The LETTER variable is also orthogonalized by 
using the residual from the regression of LETTER on the issue size, maturity and previous issue 
variables to recognize the impact that the latter variables may have on the decision of the firm to 
utilize a letter of credit.7  
 The model employs the size of the offering, SIZE, as a measure of marketability and 
potential scale economies in the underwriting process.  The coefficient for MATURITY, the 
natural log of bond years to maturity, is expected to be positive due to the typically positive yield 
curve for municipal bond yields.  Puri (1996) included a binary variable to recognize whether the 
offering was considered a new issue.  Thus, the variable, PREVIOUS, is set equal to one if, 
according to Moody's Bond Record, no other offering was made by the issuer in the past with the 
same characteristics and zero otherwise.  This distinction is based on a review of Moodys Bond 
Record for the 25 years prior to each offering in the sample.   The variable, SUPPLY, measures 
the volume of revenue bond offerings in the same month as the sample debt offering according to 
the Federal Reserve Bulletin.  The level of the U.S. Treasury security rate is included based on 
the findings of both Duffee (1998) and Longstaff and Scwartz (1995).  We employ the variable, 
LIST, as a proxy for the degree of public information regarding the borrowers, which is equal to 
one if the lessee is a publicly traded company and zero otherwise. 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
12(BBB2), 11(BBB3), 10(BB1), and 9(BB2).  None of the ratings were below BB. 
7 The regression results are not reported.  They are available from the authors upon request.  
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In previous research, different measures of reputation have been employed.  Carter and 
Manaster (1990) used the relative placement of underwriters in (stock offering) tombstone 
announcements.  In contrast, Megginson and Weiss (1991) used the relative market share of 
managing underwriters as their reputation measure.  This study employs the latter approach for 
the subsample of bonds underwritten by investment banks.  Using the Securities Industry 
Yearbook, the underwriting firms are ranked according to the percentage of yearly volume of 
municipal debt offerings in which the investment banker either sole or co-managed the offering.  
Following the approach of Carter, Dark, and Singh (1997), the reputation measure is averaged 
over the measurement period.   Similar information is not readily available to gauge the 
reputation of commercial banks as municipal bond underwriting firms.  We use, as a proxy 
measure of reputation, the number of years that the bank's parent holding company operated a 
Section 20 subsidiary with the power to underwrite municipal debt securities.  This variable is 
formed by the interaction between the dichotomous variable equal to one if the holding company 
has a Section 20 subsidiary and zero if not times the number of months between the date it was 
established and the month of the revenue bond offering.  
3.  Empirical Results 
 Table 2 first reports the t-tests of differences in means for the continuous variables shown 
in Equation (1).  Specifically, Table 2 shows that the yield spread for commercial bank 
underwritings were on average 1.71 basis points higher than those for investment bank offerings 
(i.e., 33.15 bp versus 31.44bp).  Interestingly, the highest spreads of all are when commercial 
banks acted as both underwriters and guarantors (35.35 bp).  This compares to the lowest spreads 
which are investment bank underwritten issues that have letter of credit guarantees (22.49 bp).  
Overall, standby letter of credit backing appears to lower spreads by just under 5 bp.  The 
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univariate results of Table 2 clearly question the presence of a benefit from employing 
commercial banks as both underwriters and guarantors.  Indeed, as noted above, issuers 
employing commercial banks to provide both services (Column 3, Table 2) appear to have the 
highest yield spreads analyzed on a univariate basis.   With respect to the independent variables 
in Equation (1), the bond offerings underwritten by commercial banks were significantly smaller 
in issue size than those of investment banks, with a mean of $7.43 million compared to $22.40 
million for investment bank underwritten bonds.8  The various bivariate comparisons of samples 
with and without letter of credit support (see columns (3) to (6) in Table 2) also show that the 
smaller offerings are more inclined to employ standby letter of credit backing. 
(Insert Table 2) 
 We also used Chi-square tests to examine the dichotomous variables, LIST and 
PREVIOUS, in Table 2.  The LIST variable suggest that investment banks are more likely to 
underwrite municipal bonds of publicly traded firms compared to commercial banks, although the 
differences are only weakly significant.  The results for PREVIOUS show that issuers in the 
municipal revenue bond market for the first time are more inclined to use the standby letter of credit 
as well as to employ a commercial bank in an underwriting function.  The role of the standby letters 
of credit can also be differentiated among issuers.  Both commercial banks (acting in an 
underwriting capacity) and investment banks utilized significantly more standby letters of credit 
guarantees for those issuers that were unlisted and had no previous issues (i.e. those issues about 
which there was the greatest information asymmetry between issuers and underwriters). 
 
                                                 
8 These issues were considerably smaller than the corporate debt offerings examined by Gande, Puri, 
Saunders, and Walter (1997).  For their study the mean issue sizes were $96 million for commercial bank 
underwriters and $162 million for investment bank underwriters. 
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Table 3 presents OLS regression results for the yield premia model employed in Equation 
(1).  The positive coefficient for maturity reflects a rising yield spread with maturity for 
municipal bonds.  Similar to Gande, et al. (1997) and Puri (1996), the regression results show 
that credit rating has a significant impact on yield premia – the higher the rating the lower the 
yield spread.  The sign for the Treasury security rate is also negative and significant as might be 
expected.  Interestingly, a month of high supply (SUPPLY) of municipal offerings doesn't lead to 
a crowding out effect in that yield spreads are marginally lower in high issue months.  Finally, 
the LIST and PREVIOUS variables appear to have statistically insignificant effects in the 
regressions in Table 3. 
(Insert Table 3) 
With respect to the effect of commercial bank underwriting and certification, Dummy 1 is 
one if a commercial bank provides a standby letter of credit but the bond is underwritten by an 
investment bank, and zero if not.  Dummy 2 is one if a commercial bank provides both a standby 
letter of credit and underwrites the issue.  The coefficient for Dummy 1 is significantly negative 
and implies a 5.77 basis point reduction in spreads compared to those offerings in which there 
was no standby letter of credit backing of issues underwritten by investment banks.  Moreover, 
the significantly positive coefficient for Dummy 2 implies a net increase in yield spreads of 3.83 
basis points when the issuer elects to employ a commercial bank as the underwriter of bonds and 
commercial banks are providers of standby letter of credit backing.  These results suggest that 
the certification effect, emanating from an investment bank as underwriter, strongly dominates 
the certification effect from commercial bank underwritings, even in the presence of standby 
letters of credit issued by commercial banks. 
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 Table 4 splits the total sample according to bond maturity and issue size.  The samples were 
split according to the median issue size and maturity, respectively.  Previous studies have shown 
that commercial banking relationships are particularly important for smaller firms.  In Table 4, 
while the negative coefficient of Dummy 1 for the smaller issues exceeds that of the large issues, 
both large and small firms benefit from the employment of the standby letter of credit along with the 
choice of an investment banker as the underwriter.  The reductions in yield premiums of 7.71 and 
5.32 basis points respectively for large and smaller firms, are both highly significant.  By contrast, 
the coefficients for Dummy 2 show that neither large nor small issues benefited from having 
commercial banks as underwriters and letter of credit providers, with small firms being more 
adversely affected than large firms.  Regarding issue maturity, the Dummy 1 coefficient is only 
significant for the long maturities while Dummy 2 is only significant for short-maturities.  
(Insert Table 4) 
 Table 5 presents regressions where the total sample is segmented according to whether the 
issue was underwritten by a commercial bank or a traditional investment bank and separating those 
issues backed and not backed by standby letters of credit.  As can be seen, the need for a 
commercial bank to issue a standby letter of credit to back a commercial bank underwriting is 
viewed adversely rather than favorably by the market (i.e., a higher spread is demanded by investors 
on such issues).  This is consistent with the bank needing to credit-enhance weaker issues, with this 
enhancement appearing to signal a lower quality issue to investors.   Indeed, the issues underwritten 
by a commercial bank without a standby letter of credit are received more favorably by the market 
(i.e., have lower spreads).  Note that, in contrast, a commercial bank-supplied letter of credit to back 
an investment bank underwriting is viewed as a favorable signal of quality and spreads are lower 
with letter of credit backing than without by some 6bp.  
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(Insert Table 5) 
 With respect to reputation, the reputation of the investment banker appears to have an 
insignificant effect on spreads, given the presence of the letter of credit.  The opposite is true in the 
commercial bank sample.  The coefficient for the variable reputation for commercial banks is 
significantly negative, indicating that the better the reputation of the commercial bank the stronger 
the certification emanating from the letter of credit is likely to be.  That is, the results for high 
reputation commercial banks (i.e., those banks with Section 20 subsidiaries) more closely conform 
to those of investment banks. 
 Thus far, we have not distinguished between the cases when the same commercial bank 
supplies both services as opposed to different commercial banks.  However, using the subsample of 
82 issues that received standby letter of credit backing and underwriting services by commercial 
banks, it is possible to analyze the benefits and costs of joint certification by the same bank.  Table 6 
presents the results of the regression analysis similar to those in Tables 3-5.  The LIST variable is 
not included because none of the firms involved in these financings were listed.  A new variable, 
SAMEBANK, is equal to one when both services are provided by the same bank and zero if 
otherwise.  As noted earlier 36 of the 82 issues employed the same bank to provide both services. 
The significantly negative coefficient for SAMEBANK in Table 6 suggests that employing the 
same bank reduces the yield premium by 6.5 bp.  Thus, the evidence favors using the same bank to 
provide “jointly” both certification services..  That is, any perceived conflicts of interest arising 
from the joint provision of  these services are perceived to be small compared to the strength of the 
positive certification signal that emanates from joint (double) certification by the same bank. 
(Insert Table 6) 
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Summary and Conclusions  
 This paper has employed data from the industrial revenue bond new issue market to 
examine the size and value (if any) to issues of using commercial banks as both underwriters and 
suppliers of credit guarantees.  In theory, both activities have certification value.  The value of these 
services is benchmarked against a sample of issues that have been underwritten by investment banks 
(with and without letter of credit backing).  
 The results suggest that the use of commercial banks, as both underwriters and credit 
guarantors, might actually be harmful to issuers except in the case where the same bank offers both 
services.  This is consistent with gains from double certification dominating any potential conflicts 
of interest that may arise when the same bank offers both services.  Overall, however, those issues 
underwritten by investment banks (with or without credit guarantees) are most favorably received – 
suggesting the continuing importance (in terms of value) of traditional investment banker 
certification. 
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Appendix 
 The yield premium used in this analysis must recognize the respective tax effects on both 
the industrial revenue bonds and matched maturity treasury bonds.  That premium, PREMIUM, can 
be illustrated as follows: 
 
 PREMIUM    =       (Ym / 1- Fr – Sr) – (Yt / 1 –Sr) 
 
In which Ym and Yt  are the reoffering yield on the industrial revenue bond and yield on comparable 
maturity U.S. Treasury bond.  Fr and Sr are the federal and state income tax rates. 
 We employed the maximum federal income tax rate as reported for the years of the study.  
For state tax rates, we used the maximum income tax rate for head of family and married persons 
filling separate returns.  The source for the state tax rates was the published list by the management 
consulting firm Grant Thorton. 
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Table 1 
Public and Private Credit Market Borrowing in the United States, 1989-1998 
(in $ billions) 
 
 
           
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
           
U.S. Treasury securities 144.7 230.7 292 303.8 248.3 155.7 142.9 146.6 23.2 -47.4 
           
Corporate bonds 73.8 47.1 78.8 67.6 75.2 23.3 73.3 72.5 90.7 135.3 
           
Bank loans 41.5 5.5 -31.8 -8.9 -7.2 62.9 114.7 92.1 129.3 118.6 
           
Municipal securities 
and loans 
52.9 49.3 87.8 30.5 74.8 -35.9 -48.2 2.6 71.4 100.3 
           
           
Source:  Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System 
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Table 2 
Sample Characteristics of Industrial Revenue and Pollution Control Bonds 
 
Sample consists of 1003 issues over period 1987-1998 for which the interest rate on each bond was fixed and data was available.  PREMIUM is the reoffering 
yield less the rate on a comparable maturity US government bond which has been adjusted for differences in state tax policy in terms of basis points.  Both yields 
are adjusted for federal and state taxes.  ISSUE SIZE and MATURITY are the size in millions of dollars and maturity in years, respectively; RATING is the 
Moody’s bond rating for each issue based on the numerical scale (20-AAA, 19-Aa, etc.).  SUPPLY is the dollar amount of industrial revenue bond issues sold in 
the same month.  LIST equals one if lessee is listed on major exchange, zero if not.  PREVIOUS is one if the same bond configuration was previously offered, 
zero if not.  The mean comparison first tests for equal/unequal variances and then use the appropriate t-test. 
 
                
    Underwriter         
   
Underwriter 
 
Commercial Bank 
 
Investment Bank 
Standby Letter  
of Credit 
 
t-Statistics 
 Total 
Sample 
Mean 
Commercial 
Bank 
(192) 
Investment 
Bank 
(811) 
Letter of 
Credit 
(82) 
No Letter 
of Credit 
(110) 
Letter of 
Credit 
(146) 
No Letter 
of Credit 
(665) 
 
Yes 
(228) 
 
No 
(775) 
 
1, 2 
 
3, 4 
 
3, 5 
 
4, 6 
 
5, 6 
 
7, 8 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)       
                
PREMIUM 
(Basis points) 
   31.77 33.15 31.44 35.35 29.97 22.49 32.90 27.89 32.82 2.16** 2.51** 5.25*** 0.69 4.35*** 2.33** 
                
ISSUE SIZE 
($millions) 
22.31 7.43 22.40 3.27 9.29 4.20 26.19 4.35 24.43 6.77** 3.22*** 0.20 4.70*** 13.57*** 14.00*** 
                
MATURITY 
(months) 
249.65 180.46 255.27 127.51 213.97 177.03 270.08 163.16 264.14 8.60*** 7.26*** 4.32*** 4.32*** 8.98*** 13.40*** 
                
RATING1 14.60 15.05 14.22 16.57 13.90 16.65 13.66 16.67 13.75 4.95*** 9.50*** 1.13 1.84* 18.97*** 22.55*** 
                
SUPPLY 
($millions) 
 9982  9505  9673  8852  9560  9193  9664  9281  9746 0.53 1.23 0.32 1.01 0.28 0.76 
                
LIST Yes  560  96  464  0  96  6  458  6  554       
 No  443  96  347  82  14  140  207  222  221 3.28* 143.13*** 3.46* 15.68*** 205.12*** 338.68*** 
                
PREVIOUS
 Yes 
 
 460 
 
 54 
 
 405 
 
 5 
 
 49 
 
 1 
 
 405 
 
 6 
 
 454 
      
 No  543  138  406  77  61  145  260  222  321 30.09*** 34.35*** 6.00** 10.41*** 173.64*** 222.11*** 
                
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
1See scale in footnote 6. 
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Table 3 
Effect on Yield Premium of Commercial Bank as 
Providers of Standby Letter of Credit and Underwriting Services 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Premium = b0 + b1 Dummy 1 + b2 Dummy 2 + b3 Supply + b4 Issue Size + b5 Maturity + b6 Rating + b7 List 
+ b8 Previous + b9 Treasury Bond Rate 
 
Premium in terms of basis points is the yield difference between the new issue industrial revenue bond and 
the equivalent maturity US Treasury security bond adjusted for state and federal taxes.  Dummy 1 is a 
variable which is a one when there is a standby letter of credit but the issue is underwritten by an investment 
bank, and zero if not.  Dummy 2 is a variable which is a one when the commercial bank both provides the 
letter of credit and serves as the lead underwriter.  ISSUE SIZE and MATURITY are the size in millions of 
dollars and maturity in months, respectively; RATING is the Moody’s bond rating for each issue based on the 
numerical scale (20-AAA, 19-Aa, etc.).  SUPPLY is the dollar amount of industrial revenue bond issues sold 
in the same month.  LIST equals one if lessee is listed on major exchange, zero if not.  PREVIOUS is one if 
the same bond configuration was previously offered, zero if not.  Treasury rate is the interest rate on the 
Treasury bond at the time of offering.  All are White’s adjusted. 
 
    
 Variable    Coefficient   T-ratio   P-value  
    
Intercept 65.113 11.60 .000 
    
Dummy 1 -5.769 3.35*** .005 
    
Dummy 2 3.828 1.84** .049 
    
Supply+ -0.737 4.75*** .001 
    
Issue size 0.001 0.47 .701 
    
Maturity 0.015 2.87*** .006 
    
Rating -1.641 8.57*** .001 
    
List -0.956 0.79 .412 
    
Previous 0.986 0.89 .323 
    
Treasury rate -0.377 6.04*** .001 
    
 
Observations 1003 
Adjusted R2 0.129 
F-value 17.46 (p = .001) 
+ = 103 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 4 
Effects of Issue Size and Maturity on the Yield Premium 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Premium = b0 + b1 Dummy* 1 + b2 Dummy 2 + b3 Supply + b4 Issue Size + b5 Maturity + b6 Rating + b7 List 
+ b8 Previous + b9 Treasury Bond Rate 
 
Premium in terms of basis points is the yield difference between the new issue industrial revenue bond and 
the equivalent maturity US Treasury security bond adjusted for state and federal taxes.  Dummy 1 is a 
variable which is a one when there is a standby letter of credit but the issue is underwritten by an investment 
bank, and zero if not.  Dummy 2 is a variable which is a one when the commercial bank both provides the 
letter of credit and serves as the lead underwriter.  ISSUE SIZE and MATURITY are the size in millions of 
dollars and maturity in months, respectively; RATING is the Moody’s bond rating for each issue based on the 
numerical scale (20-AAA, 19-Aa, etc.).  SUPPLY is the dollar amount of industrial revenue bond issues sold 
in the same month.  LIST equals one if lessee is listed on major exchange, zero if not.  PREVIOUS is one if 
the same bond configuration was previously offered, zero if not.  Treasury rate is the interest rate on the 
Treasury bond at the time of offering.  P-values are in parentheses.  All are White’s adjusted. 
 
     
 Large Size Small Size Long Maturity Short Maturity 
     
Intercept 70.178 66.521 82.845 62.789 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
     
Dummy 1 -7.712** -5.322** -11.945*** -3.535 
 (.038) (.021) (.005) (.129) 
     
Dummy 2 -5.149 6.147** 1.021 4.678** 
 (.169) (.011) (.816) (.035) 
     
Supply+ -0.748*** -0.774*** -0.845*** -0.797*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
     
Issue size 0.001 0.001** -0.001 0.001** 
 (.861) (.023) (.387) (.021) 
     
Maturity 0.009 0.024*** -0.001 0.006 
 (.264) (.005) (.955) (.684) 
     
Rating -1.769*** -1.431*** -1.583*** -1.749*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
     
List -0.339 -0.976 -2.117 0.550 
 (.793) (.638) (.219) (.756) 
     
Previous 2.195* .031 3.552*** -3.004* 
 (.060) (.987) (.002) (.062) 
     
Treasury rate -0.424*** -0.385*** -0.512*** -0.330*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
     
     
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.119 0.182 0.113 
F-Statistic  10.83 8.51 13.22 8.17 
N 499 503 495 508 
+ x 103 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 5 
Examination of Interaction Between Letter of  
Credit Issuance and Underwriter Reputation on Yield Premium 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Premium = b0 + b1 Letter 1 + b2 Reputation 2 + b3 Supply + b4 Issue Size + b5 Maturity + b6 Rating + b7 List 
+ b8 Previous + b9 Treasury Bond Rate 
 
PREMIUM is the reoffering yield less the rate on a comparable maturity US government bond which has 
been adjusted for differences in state tax policy in terms of basis points.  Both yields are adjusted for federal 
and state taxes.  LETTER is one if the issue has a letter of credit and zero if not.  REPUTATION refers the 
reputation of the commercial banks and investment bank as specified in the text.  ISSUE SIZE and 
MATURITY are the size in millions of dollars and maturity in years, respectively; RATING is the Moody’s 
bond rating for each issue based on the numerical scale (20-AAA, 19-Aa, etc.).  SUPPLY is the dollar 
amount of industrial revenue bond issues sold in the same month.  LIST equals one if lessee is listed on major 
exchange, zero if not.  PREVIOUS is one if the same bond configuration was previously offered, zero if not.  
P-values are in parentheses.  All values are White’s adjusted. 
 
       
  Commercial Bank Underwriter   Investment Bank Underwriter  
       
Intercept 77.753 75.301 74.538 59.436 60.427 60.067 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
       
Letter of credit 4.971 ¾ 2.551 -6.128*** ¾ -6.586*** 
 (.209)  (0.511) (.003)  (.003) 
       
Reputation ¾ -8.255*** -8.031*** ¾ 0.115 -0.125 
  (.001) (.001)  (.515) (.509) 
       
Supply -0.750*** -0.457** -0.464* -0.716*** -0.731*** 0.731*** 
 (.001) (.047) (.054) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
       
Issue size 0.006** 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (.041) (.004) (.004) (.576) (.996) (.517) 
       
Maturity 0.024* 0.022* 0.023* 0.014** 0.016*** 0.015** 
 (.084) (.087) (.082) (.018) (.007) (.015) 
       
Rating -1.718*** -1.578*** -1.542*** -1.603*** -1.652*** -1.606*** 
 (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
       
List -1.777 -3.513 -1.592 -0.550 1.084 0.549 
 (.614) (.156) (.673) (.656) (.372) (.656) 
       
Previous -0.072 1.720 .0985 2.940** 2.094* 3.137*** 
 (.978) (.445) (.692) (.012) (.054) (.010) 
       
Treasury rate -0.567*** -0.515*** -0.523*** -0.333*** -0.361*** -3.332*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) 
       
       
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.223 0.220 0.114 0.101 0.113 
F-Statistic  6.12 7.84 6.98 14.00 12.43 12.48 
N 192 192 192 811 811 811 
       
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 6 
Effect on Yield Premium with the Same Commercial Bank  
Providing Both Standby Letter of Credit and Underwriting Services 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Premium in terms of basis points is the yield difference between the new issue industrial revenue bond and 
the equivalent maturity US Treasury security bond adjusted for state and federal taxes.  SAMEBANK is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the same bank provides the standby letter of credit and the issue underwriting 
and zero if otherwise.  ISSUE SIZE and MATURITY are the size in millions of dollars and maturity in 
months, respectively; RATING is the Moody’s bond rating for each issue based on the numerical scale (20-
AAA, 19-Aa, etc.).  SUPPLY is the dollar amount of industrial revenue bond issues sold in the same month. 
PREVIOUS is one if the same bond configuration was previously offered, zero if not.  Treasury rate is the 
interest rate on the Treasury bond at the time of offering.  All are White’s adjusted. 
 
    
 Variable    Coefficient   T-ratio   P-value  
    
Intercept 112.152 5.63 .001 
    
SAMEBANK -6.597 2.50** .012 
    
Supply -0.002 4.66*** .001 
    
Issue size+ 0.318 1.42 .155 
    
Maturity 0.012 0.56 .575 
    
Rating 3.987 2.25** .025 
    
Previous -0.263 0.00 .973 
    
Treasury rate -0.738 4.99*** .001 
    
Observations 82 
Adjusted R2 0.219 
F-value 4.29 (p = .001) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
+ = 103 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. 
 
